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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In  this  study,  we  investigate  the  extreme  loss  tail  dependence  between  stock  returns  of large  US  depos-
itory  institutions.  We  ﬁnd  that  stock  returns  exhibit  strong  loss  dependence  even  in their  limiting  joint
extremes.  Motivated  by  this  result,  we  derive  extremal  dependence-based  systemic  risk  indicators.  The
proposed  systemic  risk  indicators  reﬂect  downturns  in the  US  ﬁnancial  industry  very  well. We  also  develop
a  set  of  ﬁrm-level  average  extremal  dependence  measures.  We  show  that  these  ﬁrm-level  measures
could  have  been  used  to identify  the  ﬁrms  that were  more  vulnerable  to  the  2007–2008  ﬁnancial  crisis.
Additionally,  we explore  the  performance  of selected  systemic  risk  indicators  in  predicting  the  crisis  per-
formance  of  large  US  depository  institutions  and  ﬁnd  that  the  average  stock  return  correlations  are  also21
eywords:
xtreme value dependence
ystemic risk
ystemically important ﬁnancial
good  predictors  of  crisis  period  returns.  Finally,  we  identify  factors  predictive  of extremal  dependence  for
the US  depository  institutions  in  a panel  regression  setting.  Strength  of extremal  dependence  increases
with  asset  size  and  similarity  of ﬁnancial  fundamentals.  On  the  other  hand,  strength  of  extremal  depend-
ence  decreases  with  capitalization,  liquidity,  funding  stability  and  asset  quality.  We  believe  the  proposed
indicators  have  the  potential  to  inform  the prudential  supervision  of  systemic  risk.
Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC BY-NC-ND  license
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. Introduction
Financial crises over the last 20 years spread beyond the bor-
ers, industries or ﬁrms they originated in, causing widespread
isruption to the broader economy. The Asian ﬁnancial crisis of
997 and the Russian default of 1999 spurred turmoil around the
orld, and the collapse of the hedge fund LTCM created similar
oncerns for the US economy. More recently, the global ﬁnancial
eltdown of 2007–2008 has reverberated across many countries
 The authors thank Jordan Nott and Laurel Mazur for excellent research assis-
ance. The authors also thank Iftekhar Hasan, Jeffrey Gerlach, Jason Wu,  Levent
untay, two anonymous referees, and the participants of the FRB Richmond Applied
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omments and discussion. The opinions expressed in this manuscript belong to the
uthors and do not represent ofﬁcial positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
he  Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Reserve System.
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nd economic sectors, resulting in countless regulatory interven-
ions. It has become clear that some institutions play a critical role
n the ﬁnancial system, due to their size, leverage, and interconnect-
dness with the rest of the ﬁnancial industry. Therefore, measuring
ystemic risk in the ﬁnancial system and identifying systemically
nterconnected ﬁnancial institutions are critical tasks for policy
akers and regulators.
In recent ﬁnancial crises, extreme co-movement in asset prices
nd ﬁnancial sector stock values was  pervasive. As a result, corre-
ations among different asset classes and, in particular, correlation
mong different banks experienced huge spikes, reaching unprece-
ented levels. Patro et al. (2013) explored the potential of stock
eturn correlations of ﬁnancial institutions as systemic risk indica-
ors. They found that these correlations capture the downturns in
he US ﬁnancial system well. Building upon their analysis, we show
hat average stock return correlations can also be used to identify
he ﬁrms that are more vulnerable in a ﬁnancial crisis.
However, the Pearson correlation cannot be used in isolation
o understand the dependence of stock returns. If stock returns
ollowed a multivariate normal distribution, the Pearson correla-
ion could summarize all information on their dependence. The
iterature has documented that stock returns exhibit skewness
nd signiﬁcant excess kurtosis, which implies that they are fat
D license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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ailed,2 and thus not normally distributed. Also, the Pearson corre-
ation only measures linear dependence between assets’ returns
nd, therefore, does not account for nonlinearities. Moreover,
he Pearson correlation may  be particularly limited in assessing
ependence during ﬁnancial crises. It cannot fully capture an
ncrease in dependence in the joint tails of distributions, because
t measures “average” dependence, with no particular focus on
he extremes of distributions and, therefore, is dominated by the
bservations around the mean.3 We  believe that understanding
oss dependence in the joint extremes of the loss distributions is
rucial in understanding systemic risk because the prevalence of
ependence in the extreme tails of loss distributions is indicative
f high contagion potential between ﬁnancial institutions. Also, it is
ssential to measure co-movement of ﬁnancial institution returns
hen institutions experience stress, as it can be very different from
he co-movement during normal times. In particular, co-movement
hen institutions experience stress may  become stronger. Thus,
e believe that extremal dependence measures can be very valu-
ble tools in systemic risk measurement. Patro et al. (2013) also
cknowledges the importance of investigating tail dependencies
o measure systemic risk, but left it as an area for future research.
n this study, we ﬁll this gap and propose systemic risk measures
erived from multivariate extreme value theory (EVT), which can
apture the tail dependencies between stock returns of large U.S.
epository institutions. We  believe that these measures can be
sed as complementary tools in monitoring systemic risk and we
emonstrate their additional value to such analysis.
We construct indicators of systemic risk based on extremal
ependence measures formally developed by Ledford and Tawn
1996, 1997, 1998). The extremal dependence measure  is deﬁned
s:
 = limq→1Pr(L1 > L1,q|L2 > L2,q)
here L1, L2 stand for two loss variables and L1,q, L2,q stand for their
espective marginal qth quantiles. If  = 0, L1 and L2 are said to be
symptotically independent. If  > 0, L1 and L2 are said to be asymp-
otically dependent and  measures the strength of the asymptotic
ependence. For example, Sibuya (1960) showed that marginals
f multivariate normal distribution are asymptotically indepen-
ent as long as the correlation coefﬁcient is less than unity.4 Poon
t al. (2004) developed a simple estimation methodology to iden-
ify the existence of asymptotic dependence, as well as to measure
ts strength when it exists. We  will rely on this method for our
mpirical analysis.
We propose two complementary systemic risk indicators. The
rst indicator is the proportion of asymptotically dependent depos-
tory institution pairs to the total number of depository institution
airs in our sample, thus measuring the prevalence of asymptotic
ependence between large US depository institutions. Chan-Lau
t al. (2004) investigated the strength of ﬁnancial contagion
n international stock markets by calculating the proportion of
symptotically dependent country pairs during the Mexican peso
risis and the Asian crisis. We  borrow this measure from the inter-
ational ﬁnancial contagion literature to measure the systemic
isk in the US banking system. The other measure we  propose
2 See Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965).
3 The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient equally weights all observations in a sample.
ince observations tend to be clustered close to the mean and scarce in the tails,
bservations close to the mean tend to dominate the calculation.
4 Sibuya (1960) originally suggested asymptotic dependence and independence
s abstract theoretical concepts. It was Ledford and Tawn (1996, 1997, 1998) who
eveloped the theoretical characterization of joint tails for multivariate extremes
hich enabled estimation of the tail dependence structure through empirical diag-
ostic tests.
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s the average strength of asymptotic dependence, average ,
cross all pairs of depository institutions. This latter measure can
rovide insights regarding the strength of extremal dependence
n the US banking system, beyond the proportion of asymptotically
ependent institutions. Our results show that these indicators track
easonably well periods of ﬁnancial market turmoil and periods of
arket stability.
Besides accurately monitoring overall systemic risk, another
hallenge for regulators attempting to minimize systemic risk is
dentifying systemically important ﬁnancial institutions (SIFIs).
ppropriately measuring the vulnerability and contagion poten-
ial of ﬁrms in a systemic crisis would allow regulators to better
arget policies to contain systemic risk. In the aftermath of the
007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis, US and international policy makers are
nacting new regulations for ﬁnancial institutions perceived as “too
ig to fail”, due to their size, interconnectedness, complexity, lack
f substitutability, or global scope.5
Because systemic risk is a complex phenomenon, it is not sur-
rising that many indicators of systemic importance have been
roposed in the literature. Prominent among these measures are
he CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011), the Marginal Expected
hortfall (“MES”, Acharya et al., 2010), Distressed Insurance Pre-
ium (“DIP”, Huang et al., 2009) and the granger causality based
easures of Billio et al. (2012). We  believe that the co-existence
f multiple approaches to measuring systemic importance and
nstitution-speciﬁc vulnerability to crisis could enhance the pru-
ential supervisory toolkit and the regulation of systemic risk. We
dd to the literature by developing two complementary ﬁrm-level
easures of average tail dependence, based on the stock price co-
ovements under conditions of joint stress. Our ﬁrst measure is the
roportion of other institutions that are asymptotically dependent
ith an institution. Our second measure is the average  of an insti-
ution (i.e. the average  of the bank pairs including the institution
f interest). These measures of tail co-movement can help under-
tand the vulnerability and the contagion potential of a ﬁnancial
nstitution during a ﬁnancial crisis.
Then, we formally explore whether our measures of tail co-
ovement could have predicted the vulnerability of a ﬁnancial
nstitution to the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis. We calculated these
easures before the beginning of the crisis and investigated their
redictive power over crisis period stock returns. We ﬁnd that these
easures are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of crisis period
tock returns. In order to demonstrate the value added by the meas-
res proposed in this study, we also tested the predictive ability of
atro et al. (2013) correlation measures, Acharya et al. (2010) MES
easure, and the CAPM beta. We  ﬁnd that our measures predict cri-
is period returns better than the CAPM beta and the MES. We  also
nd that correlation based measures are good predictors of vul-
erability to a ﬁnancial crisis. This ﬁnding provides more evidence
or the usefulness of the measures proposed by Patro et al. (2013).
evertheless, we demonstrate that our measures predict ﬁnancial
risis returns better than the correlation based measures when the
risis period is chosen more narrowly, to coincide with the largest
nancial crisis losses. In particular, when crisis performance is mea-
ured with peak-to-trough returns instead of cumulative returns,
5 Both the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) (a creation of the
odd–Frank Act in the United States) and the Basel Committee weighed in on the
riteria for the designation of systemically important institutions in Q4 2011. For
he United States, the Dodd–Frank Act (Section 113) lists statutory considerations
or the designation of systemically important institutions. For additional details on
lobal designation, see Basel Committee (2011). We include many of the FSOC and
asel Committee proposed designation criteria in Section 4 when we  look at the
rm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial indicators that can predict systemic interconnectedness for
nancial institutions.
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two institutions, as the conditional probability of an institution
experiencing a loss larger than Li,q is always much greater than
the unconditional probability. Moreover, as the quantile levelE. Balla et al. / Journal of Fina
ur measures perform signiﬁcantly better. These results indicate
hat the ﬁrm-level measures proposed in this study may  predict
he vulnerability of ﬁnancial institutions to extreme market crashes
etter than the correlation measures. Therefore, we suggest that
isk managers use them in monitoring the riskiness of ﬁrms as
omplements to correlation analysis.
Zhou (2010) and Moore and Zhou (2012) suggest a method-
logy to identify “systemically important” institutions similar to
he ﬁrm-level average tail dependence measures we propose in
his paper. We  believe our approach to measure tail dependence is
referable to theirs since our methodology explicitly tests for the
xistence of asymptotic dependence following Poon et al. (2004).
n Moore and Zhou (2012) asymptotic dependence is assumed to
xist if their estimate of  is above 0.15 and to not exist otherwise,
ndependently of the precision of the estimate.
Another important contribution of this paper to the tail depend-
nce literature is that we take a step beyond measuring extremal
ependence, and try to identify factors that are predictive of tail
ependence. Identifying such factors can inform the selection
f institutions that are systemically important. In this analysis,
e consider an array of institutional characteristics traditionally
sed in the bank performance literature. We  ﬁnd that strength of
xtremal dependence increases with asset size and similarity of
nancial fundamentals. On the other hand, strength of extremal
ependence decreases with capitalization, liquidity, funding sta-
ility and asset quality.
Finally, we also calculated the proposed systemic risk indicators
sing the ﬁltered returns from a three factor Fama-French model.
e observe that the increase in systemic risk around 1998, which
oincides with the Asian crisis, Russian default and the collapse of
edge fund LTCM, was almost entirely driven by systematic mar-
et factors. On the other hand, the recent ﬁnancial crisis, which
egan as a crisis of subprime mortgages, was in large part driven
y other factors not captured by the Fama-French model. We  think
hat these observations are intuitive as the crisis in 1998 did not
riginate in the US banking industry, whereas the recent ﬁnancial
risis did. Also, we ﬁnd that after the second half of 2009 the fac-
ors driving the tail dependence among banks appear to become
ystematic in nature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
ntroduces our measures of systemic risk. In Section 3, we  demon-
trate that our measures could have been used to identify the ﬁrms
hat were more vulnerable to the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis. In
ection 4, we analyze how balance sheet variables can be used
o predict the strength of asymptotic dependence between stock
eturns of bank pairs. In Section 5, we examine the tail depend-
nce between ﬁltered returns and discuss how systematic and
on-systematic factors drove tail dependence in recent episodes
f crises. Section 6 concludes.
. Extremal dependence and systemic risk measures
Multivariate extreme value theory (EVT) is one of the promis-
ng tools in the literature to measure the dependence of extremes
nd address the drawbacks of linear correlation analysis. Numerous
tudies have applied multivariate EVT techniques to the analysis of
he tail dependence in ﬁnancial markets (e.g. Chan-Lau et al., 2004;
artmann et al., 2004; Longin and Solnik, 2001; Poon et al., 2004;
tarica, 1999). Unlike earlier studies, Poon et al. (2003, 2004) made
lear the distinction between asymptotic dependence and asymp-
otic independence, while analyzing the tail dependence structure
f ﬁve major stock indices. Such distinction is very important, as it
ndicates the existence or lack of dependence in the limiting joint
xtremes of the loss distributions. Such extremes may  have never
t
bFig. 1. An example of an asymptotically dependent institution pair.
een observed in the historical data, but dependence at those lev-
ls is what matters most when managing risk against catastrophic
vents. For example, Ergen (2014) empirically demonstrates that
he diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, measured as the reduction in extreme
ail risk, are on average three times larger for asymptotically inde-
endent emerging market pairs than for asymptotically dependent
merging market pairs.
.1. A graphical introduction to asymptotic dependence
Let L1 and L2 be two  loss random variables. And let q be the
robability of one of the loss variables Li being above the qth quan-
ile of its marginal distribution, Li,q, conditional on the other loss
ariable Lj being above its qth quantile, Lj,q.
q = Pr(L1 > L1,q|L2 > L2,q) = Pr(L2 > L2,q|L1 > L1,q)
The tail dependence measure  is deﬁned as:
 = limq→1q (1)
If  > 0, the two  loss variables, L1 and L2, are said to be
symptotically dependent, while if  = 0, they are said to be
symptotically independent. Asymptotic dependence between two
ariables means that, no matter how far into the tail of one variable
e go, the conditional probability of the other variable simulta-
eously experiencing a tail event at least as severe (in quantile
erms) never reaches zero. The limiting extreme of the loss dis-
ribution of a ﬁrm is likely to correspond to losses so large as to
ause the ﬁrm to go bankrupt. Thus, the  of a pair of ﬁrms can
oosely be interpreted as the conditional probability of default of a
rm, when the other ﬁrm defaults.6
As an example of an asymptotically dependent pair of institu-
ions, in Fig. 1, we plot q for the stock returns of JP Morgan Chase
nd Bank of America, as a function of the quantile level q.7 The
nconditional probability of a loss greater than the qth quantile is
lso plotted as the line p = 1 − q.
There is strong positive association between the losses of these6 For example, Moore and Zhou (2012) and Zhou (2010) provide this interpreta-
ion of .
7 The sample period used for the graphical analysis in Figs. 1 and 2 goes from the
eginning of 2006 to the end of 2011.
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tFig. 2. An example of an asymptotically independent institution pair.
ncreases, this positive association of losses never dies off. Instead,
s q approaches one, the conditional probability is converging to a
ositive value above 0.6. Thus, the stock returns of these two banks
re asymptotically dependent.
As an example of an asymptotically independent pair of insti-
utions, in Fig. 2 we plot the q for the stock returns of Fifth
hird Bancorp (FITB) and Hudson City Bancorp (HCBK). Fig. 2 illus-
rates how asymptotic independence is different from asymptotic
ependence, represented in Fig. 1, while also showing that asymp-
otic independence is not the same thing as exact independence.
gain, there is positive association between these two institutions,
s q is always higher than the unconditional probability (and thus
he stock returns of these two banks are not totally independent).
owever, for this pair, as q gets closer to one, the conditional prob-
bility approaches the unconditional probability and, therefore,
ero. Therefore, the stock returns of these banks are asymptotically
ndependent.
Figs. 1 and 2 are presented in order to introduce the concept of
symptotic dependence in a graphical way. These plots can serve as
iagnostic tools, but cannot be used for testing asymptotic depend-
nce in a formal way. Determining the extremal dependence
tructure for two variables requires rigorous statistical analysis and
ypothesis testing. In this paper, we follow the methodology devel-
ped by Poon et al. (2004) to determine the extremal dependence
tructure of the stock returns of large US depository institutions.8
.2. Formal statistical estimation of extremal dependence
Following Poon et al. (2004), we begin by transforming the
arginal distributions of our loss variables to unit Frechet marginal
istributions. Conversion of univariate marginal variables to a
ommon distribution is standard in tail dependence studies
ecause this conversion removes the inﬂuence of marginal distri-
utions from dependence calculations.9 In the literature, uniform
8 The formal results from the Poon et al. (2004) methodology for the JP Morgan and
he  Bank of America pair and the Fifth Third and Hudson City pair are, respectively,
hat the null hypothesis of asymptotic dependence cannot be rejected for JPMC and
AC, and  is estimated to be 0.61; and that asymptotic dependence is rejected for
ifth Third and Hudson City and, therefore, they are asymptotically independent
  = 0).
9 According to Sklar’s theorem any multivariate distribution function can be sep-
rated into its marginal distributions and another function, known as the copula,
hich reﬂects the dependence between the variables. Since the tail dependence esti-
ation method used in this paper is independent of any parametric copula assump-
ion, a detailed discussion of copula methods is not required. For an introduction
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istributions and Frechet distributions are widely used to stan-
ardize marginal distributions. In this study, we  transform the loss
ariables to have unit Frechet marginals in order to follow the Poon
t al. (2004) methodology, which has become the standard method
n estimating the extremal dependence measure . Loss variables
re converted to unit Frechet margins by the following probability
ntegral transform:
 = −1
log FL1 (L1)
and X2 =
−1
log FL2 (L2)
(2)
here FL1 and FL2 are the distribution functions for loss variable L1,
nd L2,10 and −1/log(x) is the quantile function of the unit Frechet
istribution. Since −1/log(F(L)) is a monotonically increasing func-
ion of L, this transformation has no impact on the order of the data
nd therefore has no impact on . This is because  is a quantile-
ased measure and, thus, invariant to monotonically increasing
ransformations of the data.
For Frechet distributed variables, it is known that:
imr→∞Pr(X ≤ r) = 1 − 1
r
(3)
In other words, as r increases, the (1–1/r)th quantile of Frechet
istribution converges to r. Also, Ledford and Tawn (1996) show
hat the joint tail region of two unit Frechet distributed variables
atisﬁes:
r(X1 > r, X2 > r) = l(r)r−1/ (4)
here l(r) is a slowly varying function,11 and  ∈ (0,1] is the coefﬁ-
ient of tail dependence. Using these two properties, we can derive
he  for two  unit Frechet distributed variables X1 and X2. First, we
eplace q in the deﬁnition of  by 1 − 1/r  and obtain:
imr→∞l(a ∗ r)/l(r) = 1 ∀ a > 0
Then, using (3), we  replace the (1 − 1/r)th quantile of the unit
rechet variables by r. Further, we  note that (1 − 1/r)  approaches
ne, if and only if r approaches inﬁnity. Therefore, we obtain:
 = limr→∞Pr(X1 > r|X2 > r) = limr→∞
Pr(X1 > r, X2 > r)
Pr(X2 > r)
Using (3) for the denominator and (4) for the numerator, we
btain:
 = limr→∞ l(r) × r
−1/
1/r
= limr→∞l(r) × r1−1/ (5)
Therefore,  = 1 corresponds to asymptotic dependence and  < 1
orresponds to asymptotic independence. Also, when  = 1 and we
ave asymptotic dependence,  is equal to the limit of the slowly
arying function l(r). Hence, the problem of estimating the asymp-
otic dependence structure reduces to estimating the coefﬁcient of
ail dependence  and the limit of the slowly varying function.
In order to accomplish this estimation, Poon et al. (2004) note
hat the expression on the right hand side of (4) is the same as a
ower law speciﬁcation for univariate heavy tailed variables.12 As
o copula modeling please see Nelsen (2006) and Trivedi and Zimmer (2007). Also,
or  a complete discussion of the importance of separating the marginal distributions
nd the dependence structure see Embrechts et al. (1999).
10 The empirical cdf is used as the distribution function for losses.
11 A slowly varying function is deﬁned by limr→∞ l(a*r)/l(r)= 1 ∀ a > 0.
12 In the EVT literature and for the purposes of this study, the deﬁnition of heavy-
ailed variable relies on the decay rate of the tail for the cumulative distribution
unction. If the tail of a distribution decays slower than the exponential rate, the
istribution can be categorized as a heavy-tailed distribution. Therefore, they are
ommonly referred to as sub-exponential distributions.
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see the historical values up until December 2006 and, from this
perspective, the values of these indicators in December 2006 are at
their historically highest levels. The fact that the indicators reach
13 With a sample of 6 years, we have approximately 1500 daily returns, whichFig. 3. AsympDepRate over time using six year rolling window samples.
iscussed in Appendix A, heavy-tailed distributions follow a power
aw beyond a high threshold, which can be written as:
T (t) = Pr(T > t) ∼= l(t)t−1/ for t > u (6)
here l(t) is a slowly varying function, u is a high threshold and
 is the tail parameter. Therefore, Poon et al. (2004) proposed to
onstruct a new variable, T = Min(X1, X2), so that (4) can also be
ritten as:
r(X1 > r, X2 > r) = Pr(T > r) = l(r)r−1/ (7)
Comparing this with (6), we notice that T is a heavy tailed uni-
ariate variable with tail parameter . The tail parameter can be
stimated by the Hill’s estimator and inference can be performed
sing its asymptotic properties. Details on the estimation of the tail
arameter can be found in Appendix A.
In order to test for asymptotic dependence, we test the null
ypothesis  = 1. If the null hypothesis of asymptotic dependence
 = 1) cannot be rejected, then  is calculated as the limit of the
lowly varying function l(r). Details of this calculation are also
hown in Appendix A.
.3. Systemic risk and ﬁrm-level extremal dependence measures
After the asymptotic dependence hypothesis is tested and  is
alculated for each pair of ﬁrms in our sample, we deﬁne our two
ystemic risk indicators and two ﬁrm-level extremal dependence
easures. Let:
sympDepij,t =
{
1 if ij,t > 0
0  if ij,t = 0
The ﬁrst systemic risk indicator, AsympDepRate,  is deﬁned as the
atio between the number of asymptotically dependent institution
airs and the total number of institution pairs in our dataset, for a
iven time period.
sympDepRatet =
∑
i
∑
j /=  i
AsympDepij,t
N × (N − 1)
This ratio measures the system-wide prevalence of dependence
n the joint extremes of the loss distributions of bank pairs. Thus,
sympDepRate quantiﬁes the system-wide potential for simulta-
eous extreme loss events in multiple depository institutions. In
ig. 3, we present a time series plot of AsympDepRate.  To obtain the
symptotic dependence for time t, data from the six years preced-
ng time t is used. When we repeat the calculation for time t + 1, we
i
e
t
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imply roll the sample one quarter forward. For example, asymp-
otic dependence is estimated for each pair of institutions in the
ample using data from January 1990 to December 1995, and the
sympDepRate calculated from this period is plotted at December
995. Then, the procedure is repeated using data from April 1990
o March 1996 and the AsympDepRate is plotted at March 1996, and
o on. We  have chosen a six year sample window for each iteration
ecause extreme value theory applications generally require large
ample sizes in order to accurately measure tail dependence.13
he methods only use loss events that lie in the tails of the data
nd, therefore, enough extreme loss events are necessary to obtain
recise estimates of asymptotic dependence.
The AsympDepRate systemic risk indicator captures ﬁnancial
rises well. At the end of 1995 the indicator was  below 10% but
tarted climbing, reaching nearly 25% after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
fterwards, there is a more signiﬁcant increase around the col-
apse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) on
eptember 1998 and a slow decline, up until 2004. Finally, the indi-
ator gradually increased during the 2005–2008 period, peaking at
n unprecedented 95% during the heights of the ﬁnancial crisis.
The measurement of  provides more information beyond
hat is learned by establishing that two  variables are asymptot-
cally dependent. When two loss distributions are asymptotically
ependent, we  know that the conditional probably of joint tail
osses never goes to zero, no matter how far into the joint tail we  go.
 measures the size of this conditional probability. When  is high,
e not only know that there is a positive probability that extreme
ail losses can occur simultaneously, but also that this probability
s high. We  believe that an aggregate measure of  can be a useful
ystemic risk indicator, complementing AsympDepRate.14 The sec-
nd systemic risk measure we propose, AvgChi,  is deﬁned as the
verage of  over all possible institution pairs in our dataset for the
iven time period.
vgChit =
∑
i
∑
j /= i
ij,t
N × (N − 1)
In Fig. 4, we  plot AvgChi,  calculated using a six year rolling win-
ow.
AvgChi and AsympDepRate are fairly synchronized. The main
ifference between the two is their scale. AsympDepRate is calcu-
ated from a binary variable that indicates existence of asymptotic
ependence. AvgChi measures the strength of that dependence, if
t exists. Analysis of the AvgChi indicator illustrates that the lat-
st ﬁnancial crisis was substantially more severe than the previous
rises in the end of the 1990s.
The ability of the systemic risk indicators we developed to pre-
ict ﬁnancial crises with substantial lead time may  appear limited.
nfortunately, this is a common feature shared by other indicators
f systemic risk that are based on market return information. That
eing said, the warning potential of our indicators should be eval-
ated relative to the information available ex ante. If we were in
ecember 2006, we  would not know what will happen to these
easures in 2007 and forward. Instead, we would only be able ton  turn result in approximately 75 extreme tail observations to be used in Hill’s
stimation for testing the asymptotic dependence hypothesis.
14 DiTraglia and Gerlach (2013) corroborate the importance of . They showed
hat   is priced by investors during good times (i.e. investors require a premium to
nvest in ﬁrms with large ).
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aFig. 4. AvgChi over time using six year rolling window samples.
ven higher levels in 2008, during the crisis, does not imply that
he indicators were not signaling high levels of tail dependence
uring 2006 and 2007. We  still do not interpret our indicators as
redictive of future crisis; based on the graphical analysis of the
ndicators, that would be a strong statement. However, it is obvi-
us that these indicators track periods of ﬁnancial market turmoil
nd periods of market stability reasonably well.
In order to measure the ﬁrm-level extremal dependence of indi-
idual institutions, we develop measures that are similar to the
ystemic risk indicators. A limitation of using extremal dependence
easures to evaluate an institution’s systemic importance is that
hese measures do not allow us to ascertain the direction of asymp-
otic dependence. Despite this limitation, we believe that it is useful
o determine which institutions exhibit asymptotic dependence
o a larger set of other ﬁnancial institutions and which institu-
ions exhibit, on average, stronger asymptotic dependence, as these
nstitutions may  be more vulnerable to market swings and more
ikely to propagate tail losses. Another limitation of our ﬁrm-level
easures is that they do not take into account the size and lever-
ge of the ﬁrms, and so they cannot be directly translated to an
stimate of capital shortfall under stressful conditions.
The ﬁrst measure of ﬁrm-level extremal dependence reﬂects the
ercentage of institutions that are asymptotically dependent with
 given institution.
sympDepRatei,t =
∑
j /=  i
AsympDepij,t
(N − 1)
The second ﬁrm-level extremal dependence measure we pro-
ose results from averaging  for all institution pairs an institution
s involved in.
vgChii,t =
∑
j /=  i
ij,t
(N − 1)
The usefulness of these two measures as indicators of the vul-
erability of large US depository institutions to a ﬁnancial crisis is
tudied in detail in the next section.
. Predictive power over ﬁnancial crisis returnsWe  follow the literature in selecting institutions with mar-
et capitalization greater than $5 billion at the end of June 2007
Acharya et al. (2010); Brownless and Engle (2012). Among the
iverse set of large ﬁnancial institutions with capitalization above
f
v
a
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5 billion, our sample consists of the 29 institutions that are clas-
iﬁed as depositories based on their SIC codes. We focused on
epository institutions for several reasons. First, analysis of a het-
rogeneous sample of ﬁrms from multiple industries may  lead to
nconclusive results regarding the signiﬁcance of a given measure
f vulnerability to a crisis, while focusing on a particular industry
ay  lead to a clearer picture. By focusing on depositories only, we
ere able to achieve up to 75% adjusted R2 in our regressions. Sec-
nd, depositories are the ﬁrms that have explicit deposit insurance
nd, thus, are subject to a moral hazard problem. Finally, one of
he contributions of our study is an analysis of factors predictive of
ail dependence. Such novel analysis can only be easily performed
or depository institutions, which have been subject to regula-
ory reporting for the whole period of our sample. In Appendix
, Table B1 presents the variables and their deﬁnitions used in the
mpirical analysis presented in Sections 3 and 4.
We obtain daily returns from CRSP as well as market capital-
zation and quarterly ﬁnancial data from Compustat. The panel of
rms is unbalanced, as not all companies have continuously been
rading during the sample period of January 2, 1990 to March 30,
012. Some companies such as Washington Mutual failed or were
cquired during the sample period. Further information on the
ataset construction and an account of the institutions that do not
ave returns for the entire sample period is included in Appendix
 Table B2.
Descriptive statistics for the daily percentage returns of the
rms are presented in Table 1. Not surprisingly, the minimum
aily returns are very extreme for those ﬁrms that failed during
he crisis (National City Corp with −63.34%, Sovereign bank with
72.16%, Wachovia Corp with −81.6%, Washington Mutual with
90.51%). The return of most stocks presents positive skewness
nd signiﬁcant excess kurtosis. This skewness and excess kurtosis
ndicates stocks returns have “fat tails” and, thus, are not nor-
ally distributed. Jarque Bera tests are also presented in Table 1
o provide formal evidence that the stock returns in our sample are
ot normally distributed.
Next, we  explore the predictive power of our proposed ﬁrm level
verage tail dependence measures over the stock return of ﬁrms
uring the recent ﬁnancial crisis. If these measures have explana-
ory power over the performance of ﬁnancial institutions during
nancial crises, they can potentially be used by regulators to iden-
ify the ﬁrms that are more vulnerable to systemic crisis.
In testing the out-of-sample predictive power of our measures,
e present a case study where we follow the empirical approach
aken by Acharya et al. (2010) of calculating systemic vulnerability
ndicators for a pre-crisis period, and then evaluating their abil-
ty to predict out-of-sample stock returns during the crisis period.
e consider two  potential periods for the ﬁnancial crisis. First, fol-
owing Acharya et al. (2010) and Billio et al. (2012), we consider
he ﬁnancial crisis to span from July 2007 to December 2008. Thus,
e calculate our measures as of June 30, 2007, and then use the
easures to predict cumulative stock returns from July 2007 to
ecember 2008.
Second, we  repeat the analysis deﬁning the crisis period as
anuary 2008 to December 2008. In this case, we  calculate our
easures as of December 31, 2007. The latter deﬁnition of crisis
orresponds to the period where most of the extreme losses, which
an be referred to as tail events, occurred. This is evidenced by the
escriptive statistics presented in Table 2. In Panel A, we present
rm-level vulnerability indicators as of June 2007 and return vari-
bles (cumulative and peak-to-trough returns) for the crisis period
rom July 2007 to December 2008. In Panel B, we present ﬁrm-level
ulnerability indicators as of December 2007 and the return vari-
bles are based on the crisis period from January 2008 to December
008. As expected, all of the ﬁrm-level vulnerability indicators
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics of daily percentage returns.
Notes:  The raw return data is the daily percentage return calculated as Rt = (Pt − Pt−1)/Pt−1, where Pt is the market price of a stock on the closing of day t. For some ﬁrms the
data  is not complete as can be seen from the ﬁrst column. For details on institutions that do not have returns for the entire sample period, please see Appendix B. The high
p-values in all the Jarque–Bera tests reﬂect that normality of returns was  rejected for all institutions.
N Minimum
return (%)
Maximum
return (%)
Mean Median Standard
deviation
Skewness Excess
kurtosis
JB test (p-value)
Bank of America 5796 −28.97 35.27 0.04 0 2.85 0.82 25.31 155,457.09
BB&T  5796 −23.36 23.61 0.05 0 2.17 0.66 15.19 56,226.92
Bank  of NY Mellon 5796 −27.16 24.81 0.06 0 2.47 0.56 12.74 39,559.66
Citigroup 5796 −39.02 57.82 0.06 0 3.08 1.33 42.7 442,269.18
Commerce Bancorp 4597 −12.12 26.92 0.09 0 2.32 0.5 7 9582.38
Comerica 5796 −20.3 20.69 0.04 0 2.27 0.3 12.31 36,742.58
Huntington Bancshares 5796 −30.59 50.07 0.05 0 3.19 2.08 40.46 399,912.16
Hudson City Bancorp 3389 −14.01 15.68 0.06 0 1.89 0.18 9.74 13,432.66
JPMorgan Chase 5796 −20.73 25.1 0.06 0 2.6 0.7 10.73 28,294.33
Keycorp 5796 −50.59 54.25 0.03 0 2.78 0.16 61.75 921,450.38
Marshall & Ilsley 5421 −26.03 39.01 0.05 0 2.74 1.2 33.13 249,480.67
M&T  Bank 5796 −15.61 21.06 0.06 0 1.8 0.67 14.57 51,775.76
National City Corp 4790 −63.34 65.14 0.01 0 2.77 −0.05 154.09 4,742,780.98
Northern Trust 5796 −18.81 30.91 0.06 0 2.15 0.85 15.36 57,712.74
New  York Comm.  Bank 4810 −13.8 13.95 0.07 0 2.03 0.11 6.56 8651.62
People’s United 5796 −19.05 26.67 0.07 0 2.43 0.78 11.77 34,094.28
PNC  5796 −41.4 37.09 0.05 0 2.36 0.52 36.97 330,660.97
Regions Financial 5796 −41.07 48.41 0.04 0 2.88 1.4 45.66 505,829.41
Synovus Financial 5796 −25.97 28.22 0.05 0 2.82 0.55 14.5 51,106.05
Sovereign Bank 4807 −72.16 69.53 0.07 0 3.19 −0.08 106.43 2,270,524.29
Suntrust Banks 5796 −27.17 30.56 0.05 0 2.53 0.53 21.79 114,993.68
State  Street Corp 5796 −59.04 31.35 0.08 0 2.64 −1.04 58.14 818,068.05
Unionbancal Corp 4750 −30.5 15.19 0.07 0 2.05 −0.33 15.36 46,831.85
US  Bancorp 5796 −18.17 29.39 0.07 0 2.23 0.75 17.04 70,750.83
Wachovia Corp 4790 −81.6 90.22 0.05 0 3.31 3.96 246.81 12,180,184.62
Wells  Fargo & Co. 5796 −23.82 32.76 0.07 0 2.43 1.61 27.67 187,584.35
Washington Mutual 4724 −90.51 48.76 0.01 0 3.2 −3.99 165.37 5,399,843.72
Western Union 1572 −29.01 21.03 0.01 0 2.45 −0.84 19.64 25,515.18
Zions  Bancorporation 5796 −24.54 27.56 0.07 0 2.76 0.65 17.95 78,308.51
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of variables used in regressions.
Notes: Panel A presents ﬁrm-level vulnerability indicators, total assets and leverage as of June 2007 and return variables (cumulative and peak-to-trough returns) for the
crisis  period from July 2007 to December 2008. Panel B presents ﬁrm-level vulnerability indicators, total assets and leverage as of December 2007 and the return variables
are  based on the crisis period from January 2008 to December 2008. Note that the statistics of cumulative return in Panel B are for a shorter time period. So, for example,
the  18 month equivalent of the 38.8% average decline is 58.2%, which is higher than the average decline of 45.3% shown in Panel A. ADR = asymptotic dependence rate;
Avg.Chi  = average ; Beta = CAPM beta; MES = marginal expected shortfall; Avg.Corr = average correlation across all other ﬁrms; Avg.Ken = average Kendall’s Tau = across all
other  ﬁrms; Avg.Spr = average Spearman’s Rho across all other ﬁrms; Assets = Total assets under management (see Appendix B Table B1); Lev = leverage (see Appendix B
Table B1).
N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard deviation
Panel A
ADR 27 0.038 0.923 0.658 0.769 0.255
Avg.  Chi 27 0.013 0.429 0.302 0.349 0.127
Avg.  Cor. 27 0.397 0.657 0.575 0.597 0.074
Beta  27 0.55 1.505 0.955 0.899 0.226
MES  27 1.289 3.355 2.094 1.904 0.524
Avg.  Ken. 27 0.296 0.482 0.414 0.433 0.052
Avg.  Spr. 27 0.423 0.656 0.571 0.596 0.065
Cumulative return 27 −0.996 0.306 −0.453 −0.425 0.344
Maximum return 27 −0.996 −0.187 −0.639 −0.604 0.207
Assets  27 14 2221 318 112 548
Lev.  27 2.747 9.204 6.319 6.231 1.549
Panel  B
ADR 27 0.192 1 0.801 0.885 0.188
Avg.  Chi 27 0.072 0.465 0.366 0.401 0.1
Avg.  Cor. 27 0.457 0.689 0.613 0.636 0.066
Beta  27 0.65 1.528 1.031 0.985 0.198
MES  27 1.469 3.444 2.384 2.29 0.477
Avg.  Ken. 27 0.323 0.497 0.431 0.447 0.049
Avg.  Spr. 27 0.458 0.671 0.592 0.611 0.06
Cumulative return 27 −0.988 0.502 −0.388 −0.419 0.33
Maximum return 27 −0.993 −0.096 −0.598 −0.604 0.204
Assets  27 14 2188 339 133 568
Lev.  27 2.776 26.646 8.739 8.389 4.634
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Table 3
Regression of cumulative crisis period returns (July 2007–December 2008) on ﬁrm level indicators.
Notes: The dependent variable is the cumulative return from July 2007 to December 2008. The independent variables are: ADR = asymptotic dependence rate; Avg.Chi = average
;  Beta = CAPM beta; MES  = marginal expected shortfall; Avg.Corr = average correlation across all other ﬁrms; Avg.Ken = Average Kendall’s Tau, across all other ﬁrms;
Avg.Spr = average Spearman’s Rho across all other ﬁrms; Assets = Total assets under management (see Appendix B, Table B1); Lev = Leverage (see Appendix B, Table B1).
Signiﬁcance codes: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. N = 27 since 2 depositories (Western Union and Sovereign Bancorp) drop from the sample for this period due to unavailable
data.  Estimation is performed via OLS.
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.9)
Int. .626* (.308) .618** (.296) .341 (.417) .413 (.418) 1.487*** (.457) 1.559*** (.462) 1.716*** (.499) .504 (.379) .471 (.368)
ADR −.571** (.217) −.629** (.243)
Avg. Chi −1.221*** (.430) −1.362*** (.481)
Beta −.158 (.311) .175 (.307) .207 (.302)
MES −.104 (.140)
Avg. Cor. −2.350*** (.703)
Avg. Ken. −3.422*** (.988)
Avg. Spr. −2.760*** (.792)
Assets .003 (.123) .007 (.121) .002 (.153) .028 (.159) −.004 (.115) −.009 (.114) −.013 (.113) −.029 (.137) −.031 (.134)
Lev. −.111** (.044) −.112** (.043) −.102** (.049) −.104** (.049) −.093** (.041) −.094** (.040) −.093** (.040) −.111** (.044) −.111** (.043)
R2 .409 .431 .240 .250 .483 .495 .497 .417 .443
Adj. R2 .332 .357 .141 .152 .415 .429 .431 .311 .342
(1.10) (1.11) (1.12) (1.13) (1.14) (1.15) (1.16) (1.17)
Int. .546 (.382) .510 (.372) 1.944** (.727) 1.933** (.861) 1.901*** (.676) 1.889** (.773) 2.139** (.770) 2.111** (.877)
ADR −.611** (.248) .453 (.557) .335 (.480) .348 (.479)
Avg. Chi −1.332** .4992 .816 (1.324) .594 (1.106) .605 (1.095)
Beta
MES .052 (.142) .069 (.140)
Avg. Cor. −3.807* (1.926) −3.679 (2.270)
Avg. Ken. −4.913** (2.359) −4.766* (2.696)
Avg. Spr. −4.006** (1.892) −3.858* (2.145)
Assets −.024 (.146) −.028 (.142) −.014 (.117) −.014 (.118) −.020 (.116) −.019 (.117) −.026 (.116) −.025 (.117)
** ** * * 45) * * * *
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across all other banks. The coefﬁcient associated with this measure
is also negative, and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance
level. A 1% increase in the average  of a bank implies a 1.22%18Lev. −.110 (.045) −.110 (.044) −.079 (.044) −.081 (.0
R2 .412 .437 .498 .492 
Adj. R2 .305 .335 .407 .399 
ncluded in our study increased from June 2007 to December 2007.
ore importantly, the average decline in stock prices is larger dur-
ng 2008.15 Also, average peak-to-trough returns in both panels are
f similar magnitude, which suggests that most of the sharp drops
n stock prices occurred during 2008. Therefore, we conjecture that
ur measures will capture the variation in returns during the crisis
etter when the crisis is deﬁned from January 2008 to December
008.
Finally, we repeat the analysis deﬁning stock return crisis
erformance by the peak-to-trough returns. By construction, peak-
o-trough returns are more severe than the cumulative returns
n both panels. Using peak-to-trough returns as the dependent
ariables, similarly to Billio et al. (2012), we aim to capture the
ost severe periods of crisis for each ﬁrm, and thus evaluate the
redictive ability of tail dependence over the most severe shocks
xperienced by the ﬁrms in our sample during the crisis. Again, due
o the focus of our ﬁrm-level measures on the most extreme losses,
e conjecture that our measures will outperform other vulnerabil-
ty indicators on the losses, we conjecture that our measures will
utperform other vulnerability indicators on the prediction of this
lternative measure of stock performance. We  test this conjecture
sing the third set of regressions in this section.
When a ﬁnancial institution is asymptotically dependent with
any other institutions, and the average strength of this asymp-
otic dependence (the average  of an institution) is larger, we
xpect the institution to be more vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises. This
s because strong tail dependence with other institutions leads to an
ncreased likelihood of extreme losses when a signiﬁcant number
15 One needs to adjust the statistics of cumulative return in Panel B for the shorter
ime period. The 18 month equivalent of 38.8% average decline is 58.2%, which is
igher than the average decline of 45.3% shown in Panel A.
t
r
ﬁ
d
b
c
r−.085 (.043) −.086 (.043) −.083 (.043) −.084 (.044)
.506 .502 .509 .504
.416 .411 .419 .414
f those institutions are suffering tail losses, as is the case during
nancial crises.
In all regressions in Table 3, the dependent variable is the cumu-
ative return of depository institutions during the July 2007 to
ecember 2008 crisis period. We  control for total assets under
anagement and for the leverage of ﬁrms as of June 2007. Leverage
s calculated as:
VG = book assets − book equity + market value of equity
market value of equity
Book value of assets, book value of equity, and market value of
quity were downloaded from Compustat.16
In regression (1.1), the explanatory variable ADR (AsympDe-
Rate) is the percentage of other banks that are asymptotically
ependent with the bank for which returns are being predicted.
he coefﬁcient of this variable is negative as expected, and it is
tatistically signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level. The economic
mpact implied by this coefﬁcient is quite large. Being asymptot-
cally dependent with one more bank implies an additional stock
rice decline of 2.19%17 during the crisis period. In regression (1.2),
he explanatory variable AvgChi is the average  of a bank taken16 Consistently with Acharya et al. (2010) and Billio et al. (2012), leverage is sta-
istically signiﬁcant in all regressions and has a negative impact on the crisis period
eturns, whereas total asset size does not have statistically signiﬁcant effect on
nancial crisis returns.
17 There are 27 banks in this regression since 2 ﬁrms drop due to unavailable
ata for this period. Therefore being asymptotically dependent with one other
ank increases the AsympDepRate by 1/26, which results in a −0.571/26 = −0.0219
hange in crisis return.
18 A 1% increase in AvgChi results in a 0.01*(−1.221) = −0.0122 change in crisis
eturn.
E. Balla et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 15 (2014) 195–209 203
Table  4
Regressions of cumulative crisis period returns (January 2008–December 2008) on ﬁrm level indicators.
Notes:  The dependent variable is the cumulative return from January 2008 to December 2008. The independent variables are: ADR = asymptotic dependence rate;
Avg.Chi  = average ; Beta, CAPM beta; MES  = marginal expected shortfall; Avg.Corr = average correlation across all other ﬁrms; Avg.Ken = average Kendall’s Tau across all
other  ﬁrms; Avg.Spr = average Spearman’s Rho across all other ﬁrms; Assets = Total assets under management (see Appendix B, Table B1); Lev = leverage (see Appendix B,
Table B1). Signiﬁcance codes: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. N = 27 since 2 depositories (Western Union and Sovereign Bancorp) drop from the sample for this period due to
unavailable data. Estimation is performed via OLS.
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) (2.9)
Int. .483** (.229) .453** (.198) .487 (.303) .535* (.273) .943* (.461) .891* (.438) .990* (.493) .938*** (.331) .828** (.304)
ADR −.612** (.256) −.595** (.244)
Avg. Chi −1.268** (.471) −1.173** (.460)
Beta −.494 (.283) −.469* (.257) −.409 (.256)
MES −.248** (.115)
Avg. Cor. −1.596** (.754)
Avg. Ken. −2.142** (1.013)
Avg. Spr. −1.729** (.834)
Assets −.071 (.090) −.063 (.087) .005 (.104) .015 (.100) −.055 (.092) −.056 (.092) −.058 (.092) .002 (.094) .000 (.093)
Lev. −.041*** (.011) −.041*** (.011) −.042*** (.012) −.038*** (.011) −.038*** (.011) −.039*** (.011) −.038*** (.011) −.042*** (.010) −.042*** (.010)
R2 .510 .534 .459 .490 .487 .487 .484 .574 .582
Adj. R2 .446 .473 .389 .424 .420 .420 .417 .497 .506
(2.10) (2.11) (2.12) (2.13) (2.14) (2.15) (2.16) (2.17)
Int. .850*** (.296) .762** (.273) .717 (.499) .384 (.585) .720 (.458) .438 (.524) .745 (.527) .406 (.611)
ADR −.520** (.249) −.453 (.396) −.447 (.378) −.460 (.378)
Avg. Chi −1.051** (.476) −1.366 (.915) −1.290 (.866) −1.325 (.860)
Beta
MES −.202* (.110) −.178 (.111)
Avg. Cor. −.607 (1.143) .175 (1.395)
Avg. Ken. −.881 (1.465) .054 (1.774)
Avg. Spr. −.666  (1.201) .116 (1.446)
Assets −.001 (.093) −.003 (.093) −.065 (.092) −.065 (.090) −.065 (.091) −.064 (.090) −.066 (.091) −.064 (.090)
*** *** *** *** .011) *** *** *** ***
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aLev. −.039 (.010) −.039 (.010) −.040 (.011) −.041 (
R2 .575 .583 .516 .534 
Adj. R2 .498 .507 .428 .450 
dditional decline in stock price during the crisis. The adjusted R2’s
f the ﬁrst two regressions are 40.9% and 43.1%, respectively.
In regression (1.3)–(1.7) we used several other measures from
he ﬁnance and systemic risk literatures as explanatory variables.
egressions (1.3) and (1.4) use, respectively, the CAPM beta and the
ES  measure of Acharya et al. (2010) as explanatory variables.19
s expected, high values on these measures seem to predict lower
risis returns. However, both are not statistically signiﬁcant. In
egressions (1.5)–(1.7) we analyze the ability of the average cor-
elation measures (Pearson, Kendall and Spearman, respectively)
roposed by Patro et al. (2013) to predict crisis returns. The
hree regressions produce negative and statistically signiﬁcant
oefﬁcients for these correlation measures. Moreover, the adjusted
2’s of these regressions are higher than the adjusted R2’s of the
egressions including the measures proposed in this study (regres-
ions 1.1 and 1.2). Patro et al. (2013) demonstrated that these
easures capture the downturns in the US ﬁnancial system well.
owever, in that study, the authors did not perform this type of
vent study, in order to show the usefulness of their measures in
dentifying the ﬁrms that are more vulnerable to a ﬁnancial cri-
is. Our study closes this gap and provides additional evidence in
upport of the measures developed by Patro et al. (2013).
In regressions (1.8)–(1.17) we include our average tail depend-
nce measures together with other measures from the literature.
s all these measures capture the systemic vulnerability of depos-
tory institutions in different ways, multicollinearity is likely to
e a problem. We observe this in the results. When our measures
re included together with the CAPM beta and the MES measure,
he sign of the coefﬁcients of the latter measures become positive,
19 Calculation of MES  requires the choice of a “market” index. We  used the CRSP
alue-weighted index as suggested by Acharya et al. (2010). The same index is used
s  the systematic factor in the calculation of CAPM beta.
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u−.040 (.011) −.041 (.011) −.040 (.011) −.041 (.011)
.518 .534 .517 .534
.430 .449 .429 .450
lthough not statistically signiﬁcant. Similarly, when our measures
re included together with average correlation measures proposed
y Patro et al. (2013), the signs of the coefﬁcients associated with
ur measures become positive, while, in most cases, the coefﬁcients
ssociated with the average correlation measures lose their statisti-
al signiﬁcance. We  conclude that the counter-intuitive coefﬁcient
igns are the result of multicollinearity, but also that the average
orrelation measures capture the vulnerability to the ﬁnancial cri-
is, deﬁned as June 2007 to December 2008, somewhat better than
ur measures.
As mentioned in the introduction, the proposed measures in this
tudy aim to provide complementary tools to address the limita-
ions of the linear correlation coefﬁcients in measuring dependence
n the joint tails.20 Particularly, we  expect our measures to perform
etter in periods of severe stress. Statistically speaking, they should
e better predictors of a ﬁrm’s vulnerability in periods where more
ail events were observed across the ﬁnancial industry. To test this
onjecture, we  change the deﬁnition of the crisis period. Instead
f the period used by Acharya et al. (2010) and Billio et al. (2012),
uly 2007 to December 2008, we calculate the average tail depend-
nce measures as of the end of December 2007 and try to predict
tock returns during the January 2008 to December 2008 period.
or these regressions, the control variables asset size and the lever-
ge are also calculated as of the end of December 2007. The results
re presented in Table 4.
Similarly to the regressions previously discussed, higher values
f our proposed measures, ADR and AvgChi,  are predictive of lower
tock returns. Their effects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
evel. Unlike in the prior regression, the negative effect of the MES
easure on crisis returns is now also statistically signiﬁcant at the
20 For a complete discussion of the limitations of correlation coefﬁcients as meas-
res of tail dependence, see Embrechts et al. (1999).
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Table 5
Regressions of peak-to-trough crisis period return (January 2008–December 2008) on ﬁrm level indicators.
Notes:  The dependent variable is the peak to trough return for the January 2008–December 2008 period. Independent variables are: ADR = asymptotic dependence rate;
Avg.Chi = average ; Beta = CAPM beta; MES  = marginal expected shortfall; Avg.Corr = average correlation across all other ﬁrms; Avg.Ken = average Kendall’s Tau across all
other  ﬁrms; Avg.Spr = average Spearman’s Rho across all other ﬁrms; Assets = Total assets under management (see Appendix B, Table B1); Lev = leverage (see Appendix B,
Table B1). Signiﬁcance codes: ***p < 0.01; *p < 0.1. N = 27 since 2 depositories (Western Union and Sovereign Bancorp) drop from the sample for this period due to unavailable
data.  Estimation is performed via OLS.
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.8) (3.9)
Int. .118 (.097) .059 (.085) −.145 (.175) −.080 (.157) .440* (.227) .358 (.222) .442* (.249) .275* (.144) .159 (.134)
ADR −.560*** (.108) −.553*** (.106)
Avg. Chi −1.073*** (.201) −1.047*** (.203)
Beta −.185 (.163) −.161 (.111) −.109 (.113)
MES −.114* (.066)
Avg. Cor. −1.292*** (.371)
Avg. Ken. −1.640***(.513)
Avg. Spr. −1.338*** (.422)
Assets −.055 (.038) −.049 (.037) −.027 (.060) −.016 (.057) −.042 (.045) −.044 (.046) −.045 (.047) −.030 (.041) −.032 (.041)
Lev. −.029*** (.005) −.028*** (.005) −.029*** (.007) −.027*** (.006) −.026*** (.006) −.027*** (.006) −.027*** (.006) −.029*** (.005) −.029*** (.005)
R2 .772 .779 .532 .562 .676 .658 .656 .792 .788
Adj. R2 .742 .750 .471 .505 .634 .613 .611 .754 .749
(3.10) (3.11) (3.12) (3.13) (3.14) (3.15) (3.16) (3.17)
Int. .240* (.129) .140 (.121) .183 (.212) −.081 (.248) .153 (.195) −.104 (.221) .156 (.224) −.138 (.257)
ADR −.529*** (.108) −.515*** (.168) −.535*** (.161) −.538*** (.161)
Avg. Chi −1.016*** (.211) −1.270*** (.388) −1.315*** (.365) −1.316*** (.362)
Beta
MES −.067 (.048) −.046 (.049)
Avg. Cor. −.169 (.485) .354 (.591)
Avg. Ken. −.132 (.624) .598 (.747)
Avg. Spr. −.096  (.511) .494 (.608)
Assets −.032 (.041) −.033 (.041) −.053 (.039) −.051 (.038) −.054 (.039) −.051 (.038) −.054 (.039) −.051 (.038)
Lev. −.028*** (.005) −.028*** (.005) −.028*** (.005) −.029*** (.005) −.028*** (.005) −.029*** (.005) −.028*** (.005) −.029*** (.005)
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bR2 .791 .787 .773 .782 
Adj. R2 .753 .749 .732 .743 
% level (regression 2.4). The three average correlation measures
roposed by Patro et al. (2013) are also signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
nd retain their negative coefﬁcients (see regressions 2.5 through
.7). The conjecture that our measures would likely perform better
n a period reﬂecting a more severe crisis is conﬁrmed. The regres-
ions using our average tail dependence measures (regressions 2.1
nd 2.2) have higher adjusted R2 (44.6% and 47.3%, respectively)
han the regressions using average correlation coefﬁcients (42%).
hen our ADR measure is included in the regressions jointly with
verage correlation measures (regressions 2.12, 2.14 and 2.16), we
bserve that both variables have negative coefﬁcients, but neither
s statistically signiﬁcant due to multicollinearity. When AvgChi
s included together with the average correlation measures, we
bserve that the AvgChi has a negative, not statistically signiﬁcant,
oefﬁcient, while the average correlation measures have positive
oefﬁcients. We  conclude that tail dependence measures provide
etter explanatory power of stock return performance for the crisis
eriod.
So far, we used the cumulative stock return during a uniﬁed
tress period to measure the performance of ﬁrms during the cri-
is. Alternatively, the stress period can be deﬁned separately for
ach ﬁrm as the period where the worst cumulative return was
ealized for that ﬁrm. One possible measure of performance that
e adopt for this purpose is the minimum cumulative return dur-
ng the ﬁnancial crisis, which coincides with the maxloss variable
sed in Billio et al. (2012). This variable can also be interpreted
s the peak-to-trough return. It is possible for a ﬁrm to perform
ell at the beginning of the exogenously deﬁned crisis period and
hen suffer severe losses in market value later on, or vice versa.
hus, a period of gains may  smooth out severe losses during the
ost stressful period for a ﬁrm. The alternative deﬁnition of the
risis period addresses this pitfall, by concentrating on the worse
tretch of the ﬁnancial crisis from each individual ﬁrm’s perspec-
ive. Due to this deﬁnition of the crisis period, the crisis returns
d
e
c.772 .785 .772 .785
.731 .746 .731 .746
ecome even more severe and more dominated by tail events.
herefore, under this deﬁnition of crisis period, we conjecture that
he average tail dependence measures proposed in this study can
o a better job of identifying the ﬁrms that are more vulnerable
o the crisis. We  repeated the regressions discussed above for this
eﬁnition of the crisis period. The results of these regressions are
resented in Table 5. In these regressions, we  calculated the inde-
endent variables as of the end of December 2007 and we used the
eak-to-trough return during the January 2008 to December 2008
eriod as the dependent variable.
Both the ADR and the AvgChi measures perform well in these
egressions, as they are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
nd the regressions including these two  variables (regressions
.1 and 3.2) both have an adjusted R2 above 74%. The average
orrelation measures also perform well, as they are statistically
igniﬁcant at 1%, and the regressions including them (regressions
.5 through 3.7) have adjusted R2 ranging from 61% to 63%. The
ifference in explanatory power reveals that the measures based
n tail dependence do a better job in identifying the ﬁrms that
re more vulnerable to the crisis. This ﬁnding can also be con-
rmed by the results of regressions including tail dependence
easures together with average correlation measures (regressions
.12 through 3.17). Again, multicollinearity is a problem and we
bserve some coefﬁcients with unintuitive signs for the average
orrelation variables. However, in these regressions our proposed
ail dependence measures perform better, and turn out to be sta-
istically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all regressions. This contrasts
ith what we observed in Table 3, where the opposite happened.
verall, the results conﬁrm our conjecture that tail dependence
ased measures perform better when the dependent variable is
eﬁned in a more severe way, and thus is more reﬂective of tail
vents.
Two key ﬁndings of this section should be emphasized. First, the
orrelation based measures developed by Patro et al. (2013) can be
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Table  6
Descriptive statistics, when ij,t+1 > 0.
Notes: ADij,t = Binary indicator of asymptotic dependence between bank i and j. Balance-sheet variables are described in detail in Table B1 in Appendix B. Similarity(Yi,t , Yj,t) =
1  − (
∣∣Yi,t − Yj,t∣∣)/(Yi,t + Yj,t ).
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
ij,t+1 10,880 .449 .100 .202 .731
ij,t 10,850 .406 .165 0 .731
ADij,t 10,850 .900 .301 0 1
Min{Ln(Assets)i,t , Ln(Assets)j,t} 10,600 10.91 .851 7.55 14.63
Similarity(Ln(Assets)ij,t) 10,600 .943 .044 .776 1
Min{(Capital/Assets)i,t ,(Capital/Assets)j,t} 10,600 .083 .018 .044 .144
Similarity((Capital/Assets)ij,t) 10,600 .886 .097 .298 1
Min{(Cash/Assets)i,t ,(Cash/Assets)j,t} 10,362 .046 .039 .003 .379
Similarity((Cash/Assets)ij,t) 10,362 .598 .268 .017 1
Min{(Deposits/Liabilities)i,t ,(Deposits/Liabilities)j,t} 9705 .618 .093 .334 .846
Similarity((Deposits/Liabilities)ij,t) 9705 .904 .073 .535 1
Min{(Net  Income/Assets)i,t ,(Net Income/Assets)j,t} 10,585 .001 .005 −.047 .008
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Min{(Non-Performing Assets/Assets)i,t , (Non-Performing Assets/Assets)j,t} 
Similarity((Non-Performing Assets/Assets)ij,t) 
sed to identify ﬁrms that are more vulnerable to the occurrence of
 systemic crisis. Second, the tail dependence based measures we
roposed in this study can add further value beyond the informa-
ion provided by correlation based measures and, thus, can be used
s complementary tools in the analysis of systemic risk. Therefore,
e recommend risk managers and bank regulators to monitor tail
ependencies of ﬁrm stock returns in addition to correlations.
. Predicting asymptotic dependence
In this section we analyze how balance sheet variables can be
sed to predict the strength of asymptotic dependence. Table 6
resents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this sec-
ion. As it is discussed in the previous sections, strong asymptotic
ependence is usually associated with high systemic risk. Thus,
e believe factors predictive of asymptotic dependence are factors
o consider when deﬁning systemically important institutions. In
ur analysis, we assume that the expected value of the strength
f asymptotic dependence between two banks, ij,t+1, follows the
ollowing linear structure:
[ij,t+1|ij,t+1 > 0] = c1 + c2 · 1{ij,t = 0} + ij + t+1
+ ij,t + ˇXij,t
here ij = bank pair ﬁxed effect, t = quarter ﬁxed effect, and
ij,t = balance sheet variables for institutions i and j in quarter t.
We estimated this linear structure through a ﬁxed effects
egression. The aim of this regression is to identify predictors of the
trength of asymptotic dependence, when asymptotic dependence
xists, and thus we exclude observations for which ij,t+1 equals
ero. We  have adopted ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation,
espite ij,t+1 being bounded between zero and one, because it
llows us to include bank pair ﬁxed effects – which prove crucial
o properly identify the predictors of extremal dependence – while
voiding the incidental variables problem. This comes at the cost
f having a slightly misspeciﬁed model (i.e. the error terms are not
ormally distributed, as they are assumed to be in OLS estimation).
The balance sheet variables we consider in our forecasting
egressions are meant to differentiate ﬁnancial institutions accord-
ng to criteria typically considered in the literature. We  distinguish
nstitutions according to size, capital, liquidity, funding stability,
arnings and asset quality using data from COMPUSTAT.21 We
21 Data is used between 1995Q3 and 2011Q4. With a 6-year rolling window
pproach and stock price data starting from January 1990, the ﬁrst Chi estimated
orresponds to 1995Q4.
d
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10,585 .998 .004 .950 1
9480 .006 .006 0 .047
9480 .639 .280 0 1
easure size by the log of the bank’s total assets; capital by equity
apital divided by total assets; liquidity by cash divided by total
ssets; funding stability by the ratio between long-term deposits
nd liabilities; earnings by net income divided by total assets; and,
nally, asset quality by the ratio between non-performing assets
nd total assets.
Assessing the effect of balance sheet variables on the measures
f asymptotic dependence is challenging in our empirical setup
ecause for each bank pair observation we have two  sets of balance
heet variables. We  have opted to include two  measures for each
ariable, the minimum value for the indicator between the two
nstitutions, and an index of similarity between the institutions.
he similarity indexes are calculated by the expression22:
imilarity(Yi,t, Yj,t) = 1 −
∣∣Yi,t − Yj,t∣∣
Yi,t + Yj,t
The two measures complement each other. The minimum mea-
ure allows us to assess how both institutions being of at least of
 certain size, having at least a certain capitalization, and so on,
ffects the strength of asymptotic dependence. On the other hand,
he similarity indexes allow us to analyze how much the differences
etween the institutions contribute to asymptotic dependence. In
eneral, we  expect increases in similarity indices to be associated
ith an increase in asymptotic dependence, as we expect simi-
ar institutions according to these indices to be more likely to be
erceived as similar by the ﬁnancial markets and, thus, more likely
o experience tail co-movement.
It is likely that the factors described above are not the only fac-
ors that can predict asymptotic dependence. Also, the analysis
resented in this section does not establish a causal relationship
etween these factors and the tail dependence of depository insti-
utions. Nevertheless, we believe it is relevant to enquire whether
hese easily accessible balance sheet and income statement metrics
an predict the development of extremal dependence.
We include time effects in the regression. Thus, the coefﬁcients
stimated capture how the variation of fundamentals across
nstitutions within time periods correlates with asymptotic
ependence. While this choice results in our regressions not being
ure forecasting regressions, as part of the “time t + 1′′ variation is
bsorbed through the time ﬁxed effect, we  believe this approach
eads to more useful results. The usefulness of this analysis resides
22 Except in the case of Net Income over Assets, where similarity is equal to
 − |(Net Income/Assets)i,t – (Net Income/Assets)j,t|.
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n the identiﬁcation of factors predictive of institutions that are
ore likely to experience strong asymptotic dependence in future
eriods. Therefore, the analysis is enhanced by not confounding the
ffect of the factors in analysis with the effect of aggregate shocks
n asymptotic dependence.
When calculating standard errors for our estimates, we  have
pted to use time-period clustering. We  have experimented with
ifferent standard error speciﬁcations, including robust standard
rrors and clustering by pair of institutions, and concluded that
ime clustering produces the most conservative (largest) standard
rrors. The increase in standard errors associated with using time
lustering likely results from different error term volatilities per-
isting for different time periods, even when time effects are
ccounted for. The following section discusses the results.
. Results
Table 7 below presents the results of our regression.
These are the main ﬁndings of our analysis:
(a) Size, as measured by total assets, is a key predictor of asymp-
totic dependence. Pairs of institutions, where both institutions
are large, experience stronger asymptotic dependence than
pairs where at least one institution is small. This is an intu-
itive ﬁnding, and in line with larger ﬁnancial institutions being
more systemically important, as most systemic risk literature
shows. Also, we ﬁnd that similarity between the size of both
institutions is predictive of higher extremal dependence.
b) Capitalization is also a predictor of extremal dependence. Bank
pairs where both banks have high capital ratios are less likely to
show strong asymptotic dependence. This ﬁnding holds intu-
itive appeal to us. A possible reason is that well capitalized
institutions are less likely to experience contagion resulting
from severe losses of other well capitalized institutions. In
regard to the similarity of capital levels, we ﬁnd that this kind
of similarity does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on
the level of asymptotic dependence between two institutions.
(c) Similar to capitalization, high liquidity is predictive of low
extremal dependence. Bank pairs where both institutions are
liquid, as measured by a large proportion of cash assets, are less
likely to suffer from strong asymptotic dependence. Again, this
result has intuitive appeal. The result suggests that banks with
able 7
ij,t+1 Forecasts for large US ﬁnancial depositories.
otes: N = 9457. ADij,t = Binary indicator of asymptotic dependence between bank
 and j. Balance-sheet variables are described in detail in Table B1 in Appendix B.
imilarity(Yi,t , Yj,t ) = 1 − (
∣∣Yi,t − Yj,t∣∣)/(Yi,t + Yj,t). Time periods correspond to quar-
ers. The regression follows a ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation. Fixed-effects correspond
o  bank pairs. The regression also includes quarter dummies. Estimated standard
rrors, clustered by quarter, in parenthesis. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Min{Ln(Assets)i,t , Ln(Assets)j,t} .011** (.003)
Similarity(Ln(Assets)ij,t) .111*** (.035)
Min{(Capital/Assets)i,t ,(Capital/Assets)j,t} −.093* (.048)
Similarity((Capital/Assets)ij,t) −.001 (.007)
Min{(Cash/Assets)i,t ,(Cash/Assets)j,t} −.075*** (.026)
Similarity((Cash/Assets)ij,t) .011*** (.003)
Min{(Deposits/Liabilities)i,t ,(Deposits/Liabilities)j,t} −.033** (.015)
Similarity((Deposits/Liabilities)ij,t) .016 (.014)
Min{(Net Income/Assets)i,t ,(Net Income/Assets)j,t} .319 (.507)
Similarity((Net Income/Assets)ij,t) −.137 (.405)
Min{(Non-Performing Assets/Assets)i,t ,(Non-Performing
Assets/Assets)j,t}
1.698*** (.203)
Similarity((Non-Performing Assets/Assets)ij,t) .004 (.002)
ij,t .481*** (.032)
ADij,t −.186*** (.015)
Constant .230 (.408)
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a good liquidity position are not likely to experience contagion
from tail losses of other liquid banks. Also, similarity in the ratio
of cash to assets is predictive of stronger extremal dependence.
d) Higher stability of funding sources, as proxied by the share of
deposits on total liabilities, also decreases asymptotic depend-
ence. When both institutions enjoy a large share of deposit
funding, they are less likely to suffer strong asymptotic depend-
ence. Again, similarly to the effect of capitalization and liquidity
on asymptotic dependence, this result is intuitive. Banks with
stable funding sources are less likely to experience contagion
due to tail losses of other banks with stable funding. In regard to
the similarity of funding stability, we do not ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant effect of this kind of similarity on the asymptotic
dependence between two banks.
e) Proﬁtability, as measured by the ratio between net income
and total assets, does not signiﬁcantly impact the strength of
asymptotic dependence.
(f) Low asset quality is predictive of stronger extremal depend-
ence. When both banks have high levels of non-performing
assets, they experience stronger asymptotic dependence.
Again, we  believe this result is intuitive. When banks hold
a high proportion of non-performing assets, it is likely that
they are more vulnerable to contagion, and thus to experience
losses simultaneously with other distressed banks. Similarity
in regard to asset performance does not predict the strength of
asymptotic dependence.
g) Overall, higher similarity between institutions is predictive of
stronger asymptotic dependence. We  believe this result is intu-
itive, as similar banks according to these metrics are likely to be
perceived similarly in the ﬁnancial market, and thus more likely
to experience large losses of market value simultaneously.
. Analysis of tail dependence for ﬁltered returns
The upswings and downswings in the level of tail dependence
etween depository institutions can be the result of changes in the
arket systematic risk, as well as the result of changes in risk fac-
ors that are common to depository institutions, but not to the
arket as a whole, or even due to risk factors that are speciﬁc
o a pair of banks. In this section, we analyze tail dependence of
epository institutions, once systematic market factors are ﬁltered
ut. For this purpose, we use the Fama and French (1993) three
actor model, which includes an overall market factor, a ﬁrm size
actor, and “book-to-market” factor. The ﬁrst factor is the excess
arket return over the risk-free return. The second factor, SMB
small minus big), measures the excess returns of small capital-
zation stocks over big capitalization stocks. The third factor, HML
high minus low), measures the excess return of stocks with high
ook to market values over the stocks with low book to market
alues.23 Similarly to our estimation of asymptotic dependence,
e used rolling windows of six years to estimate the effects of the
ama-French factors on excess returns.
The evolution through time of the average R2 of the Fama-French
egressions across all ﬁrms is presented in Fig. 5. There is a clear
rend of increasing explanatory power for the three factors, sug-
esting that the returns of depository institutions have become
ore tightly linked to the overall market movements over time.
his ﬁnding is consistent with Patro et al. (2013) and De  Nicolo
nd Kwast (2002). Also, this ﬁnding may  partly explain the rise in
symptotic dependence and systemic risk in the banking system.
23 We downloaded these three factors with daily frequency from Kenneth French’s
ebsite: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.
tml.
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Fig. 5. Time series plot of average R2 across all ﬁrms from the Fama-French regres-
sions.
Fig. 6. Time series plot of AsympDepRate measure using raw returns (blue-left axis),
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Fig. 7. Time series plot of the AvgChi measure using raw returns (blue-left axis) and
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Und using the ﬁltered returns (brown-right axis). (For interpretation of the refer-
nces to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web  version of this
rticle.)
owever, it does not seem sufﬁcient to fully explain the sharp rise
n tail dependence during the crisis period.
Next, we calculate the systemic tail dependence measures pro-
osed in Section 2, AsympDepRate and AvgChi,  after the systematic
omponent of the returns is ﬁltered. Time series plots of these
easures are presented in Figs. 6 and 7, respectively. In these plots,
he measures calculated from raw returns are presented in blue
nd their value is displayed in the left axis, while measures calcu-
ated from ﬁltered returns are presented in brown and their value
s displayed in the right axis.
Since the systematic component is ﬁltered out, the tail depend-
nce of ﬁltered returns is much lower in scale and more volatile.
owever after adjusting for scale, we observe a moderate amount
f overlap between the two lines. Several observations are note-
orthy.
First, the tail dependence of raw returns increased over the
996–1998 period and spiked in 1998Q4, whereas the tail depend-
nce of ﬁltered returns stayed at low levels until 2000. This implies
hat the upswing in the tail dependence of depository institutions
eturns was mostly driven by market-wide systematic risk and not
y factors speciﬁc to depository institutions. We  believe that this
akes sense because the market stress at this time did not origi-
ate within the banking sector. Instead, this time interval coincides
ith the Asian crisis, the Russian default and the failure of hedge
und Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).
t
ﬁ
v
ising the ﬁltered returns (brown-right axis). (For interpretation of the references to
olor in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Second, we observe that the tail dependence of the ﬁltered
eturns increased sharply before the global ﬁnancial crisis. The tail
ependence of the raw returns followed the same pattern with
ome lag. This suggests that factors speciﬁc to the banks initially
ead to the signiﬁcant increase in tail dependence, and therefore to
he increase in systemic risk, in the period leading up to the last
nancial crisis. We  believe that this also makes sense because the
ecent ﬁnancial crisis originated in the banking sector.
Third, we  observe that the tail dependence of raw returns stay
t very high levels even after the global ﬁnancial crisis, even though
he tail dependence of the ﬁltered returns came down signiﬁcantly
n the second half of 2009. One possible explanation for this pattern
s that while the factors initially driving tail dependence between
epository institutions were speciﬁc to the banking system, after
he second half of 2009 the factors became systematic in nature.
e believe that further research is needed to fully understand the
elationship between market-wide and industry-speciﬁc factors
riving the tail dependence of stock returns.
. Conclusion
We  ﬁnd that equity prices of large US depository institutions
xhibit strong dependence even in their limiting joint extremes
y calculating the extreme-value-theory-based tail dependence
oefﬁcient  for each pair of institutions. Inspired by this ﬁnd-
ng, we propose two  complementary systemic risk indicators. The
rst indicator measures the proportion of asymptotically depend-
nt ﬁnancial institution pairs (i.e., those with positive ) to the
otal number of ﬁnancial institution pairs in our sample. Our  sec-
nd indicator is the average of  across all ﬁnancial institutions.
e also develop two complementary ﬁrm-level measures of aver-
ge tail dependence. Our ﬁrst ﬁrm-level measure is the proportion
f institutions that are asymptotically dependent with that institu-
ion. Our second measure is the average  of an institution across
ll the bank-pair combinations involving that institution.
Our analysis shows that the indicators of systemic risk tracked
airly well the periods of ﬁnancial turmoil and stability. The abil-
ty of the systemic risk indicators we  developed to predict future
nancial crises with substantial lead time may  appear limited.
nfortunately, this is a feature shared by other indicators of sys-
emic risk based on market return information. Nevertheless, our
rm-level analysis shows that extremal dependence measures add
alue to the analysis of systemic risk, as they can contribute to the
dentiﬁcation of institutions more vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises.
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nonredeemable,
noncontrolling interest in
subsidiaries
Cash/Assets CHEQ/ATQ Cash and all securities readily
transferable to cash as a share
of total assets08 E. Balla et al. / Journal of Fina
We also studied whether our extremal dependence measures
ould contribute to the development of balance sheet indicators
f vulnerability to ﬁnancial crisis. To do so, we explored what
nstitutional balance sheet information can be used to predict the
trength of asymptotic dependence. We  consider criteria identiﬁed
n the systemic risk literature and designated by the Dodd Frank Act
section 113) in the United States and the Basel Committee inter-
ationally. Size, capitalization, liquidity, funding sources and asset
uality of ﬁnancial institutions are good predictors of asymptotic
ependence. Also, high similarity between institutions is predictive
f high asymptotic dependence.
Lastly, we calculated systemic risk measures from ﬁltered
eturns obtained by applying the three-factor model of Fama-
rench. These adjusted measures revealed interesting ﬁndings. For
xample, while the increase in systemic risk around 1998 was
lmost entirely driven by systematic market factors, the increase
uring the recent ﬁnancial crisis was driven in a large part by fac-
ors not captured by the Fama-French model. We  believe this is an
ntuitive ﬁnding since the crisis in 1998 did not originate in the
S banking sector, while the recent ﬁnancial crisis was triggered
y the subprime lending of US banks. Also, we ﬁnd that after the
econd half of 2009 the factors driving the tail dependence among
anks became systematic in nature.
In this paper, we focused on large US depository institutions,
eaving to future research possible extensions to other types of
nancial institutions and geographic areas. We  believe the pro-
osed measures of extremal dependence have the potential to
nform the prudential supervision of systemically important ﬁrms,
n area currently of great relevance in supervisory policy.
ppendix A. Power law and its estimation with the Hill’s
stimator
Gnedenko (1943) derived that all sub-exponential distributions
ollow a power law beyond a high threshold, which can be written
s:
T¯ (t) = Pr(T > t) ∼= l(t)t−1/ for t > u (A.1)
here l(t) is a slowly varying function, u is a high threshold and 
s the tail parameter. The tail parameter can be estimated by the
ill’s estimator. The estimation of the tail parameter relies on the
lowly varying function l(t) being approximately constant above a
igh threshold u. Due to this approximation, we have:
r(T > t|T > u) = l(t)t
−1/
l(u)u−1/
=
(
t
u
)−1/
(A.2)
The log-likelihood function of the Nu observations above the
hreshold u can be written as:
ogL(, T) =
j=Nu∑
j=1
(
−
(
log  + log u
)
−
(
1 + 1

)
log
( tj
u
))
(A.3)
The Hill’s estimator is the closed form solution to the maximi-
ation of this likelihood. The Hill’s estimator of  and the variance
f this estimator are, respectively:
ˆ
mle =
1
Nu
j=Nu∑
j=1
log
( tj
u
)
(A.4)
ˆ 2 =
ˆ2
(A.5)
Nu
Inference regarding the tail parameter can be performed due to
he asymptotic properties of the Hill’s estimator, as shown in Hill
1975).
m
b
t
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Substituting t = u in (A.1), and estimating Pr(T > u) non-
arametrically with Nu/N, an estimator for the constant approx-
mating the value of the slowly varying function above u can be
btained as:
(t) = Nu
N
u1/ for t > u (A.6)
And thus, when  = 1, the estimate of  is equal to:
ˆ  = Nu
N
u
In a simulation study, McNeil and Frey (2000) found that above
he 90th quantile of fat tail distributions, the bias in tail estimation
ecomes reasonable. In our analysis, we  chose the 95th quantile of
 as the high threshold u, so that the bias is even smaller.24
ppendix B. Additional data details
As Compustat and CRSP each account for mergers and acqui-
itions differently, share prices were corrected using a stacking
ethod. For example, when Society Corporation acquired KeyCorp
referred to here as “Old KeyCorp”) on March 2, 1994, the merged
ntity adopted KeyCorp’s name and continued to trade with Old
eyCorp’s ticker. CRSP and Compustat maintain unique identiﬁers
or commercial entities; the CRSP identiﬁer (PERMNO) relates to
he trading equity, while the Compustat identiﬁer (GVKEY) applies
o the organization. The CRSP identiﬁer for KeyCorp did not change
ollowing acquisition, even though Old KeyCorp had been acquired
y Society Corporation. For this research, the primary identiﬁer
s Compustat’s GVKEY, and in case of acquisitions, the acquiring
ntity’s earlier stock prices are stacked on the post-merger share
rices. In the case of KeyCorp, Society Corporation’s closing share
rices before March 2, 1994 were stacked on KeyCorp’s closing
hare prices after March 2. Share prices are further adjusted for
tock splits by dividing the price with a cumulative factor provided
y CRSP.
able B1
Regression
variable(s)
Compustat
variable(s) &
derivation
Description
Assets,
Ln(Assets)
ATQ End-of-quarter assets in
millions of dollars
Leverage (ATQ-SEQQ +
MKVALTQ)/
MKVALTQ
Total assets (ATQ) less parent’s
stockholder equity (SEQQ) plus
market capitalization
(MKVALTQ), as a share of
market capitalization value
Capital/Assets TEQQ/ATQ Total equity as a share of total
assets; total equity is the sum
of common/ordinary equity,
preferred stock, and24 Threshold selection is a bias-variance trade-off. Selection of a very low threshold
ay  cause the asymptotic results for extremes not to hold and, therefore, may lead to
iased parameters. On the other hand, the choice of a very high threshold will cause
he parameter estimates to have a big variance, since there are only few observations
bove the threshold.
E. Balla et al. / Journal of Financial S
Table  B1 (Continued )
Regression
variable(s)
Compustat
variable(s) &
derivation
Description
Deposits/Liabilities DPTCQ/LTQ Total demand, savings, and
time deposits held on account
for individuals, partnerships,
and corporations as a share of
total liabilities
Net
Income/Assets
NIQ/ATQ Income or loss reported by a
company after expenses and
losses have been subtracted
from all revenues and gains for
the ﬁscal period, including
extraordinary items and
discontinued operations, as a
share of total assets
Nonperforming
Assets/Assets
NPATQ/ATQ Loans and leases carried on a
non-accrual basis, 90 days past
due (both accruing and
nonaccruing), renegotiated
loans, real estate acquired
through foreclosure, and
ﬁ
h
T
R
A
A
B
B
B
C
D
D
E
E
F
F
G
H
H
H
L
L
L
L
M
M
M
N
P
P
P
S
S
relations. J. Empir. Finance 6 (5), 515–553.repossessed movable property
as a share of total assets
Table B1 presents the deﬁnitions and sources of the quarterly
nancial variables used in Tables 6 and 7.
Table B2 provides an an account of the institutions that do not
ave returns for the entire sample period.
able B2
Company Obs. Description
Commerce Bancorp 4597 Commerce Bancorp was  acquired by
TD Bank in 2008.
Hudson City Bancorp 3389 Hudson City Bancorp ﬁrst issued stock
in 1999. Our sample begins in 1990
Marshall & Ilsley 5421 Marshall & Ilsley was  acquired by Bank
of  Montreal in 2011
National City Corp 4790 National City Corp was  acquired by
PNC in 2009
New York Community
Bank
4810 New York Community Bank (formerly
Queen County Savings Bank) did not
have publicly traded stock before 1993
Sovereign Bank 4807 Banco Santander acquired Sovereign
Bank in 2009. Sovereign Bank was
delisted after the acquisition
Unionbancal Corp. 4750 The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi acquired
all outstanding shares of Unionbancal
Corporation in November 2008
Wachovia 4790 Wachovia merged with Wells Fargo in
2008
Washington Mutual 4724 Washington Mutual failed in 2008
Western Union 1572 Western Union’s IPO was in 2006
T
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